nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CI'BT). There are 18 known radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear %ion with half-lives mging from less than one second to 1 1.9 days. However, only four of these remain in signScant amounts more than a day after a detonation. The nonreactive noble gas properties of the xenon mdionuclides ensure that they will be the first and perhaps the only fission products released in a covert nuclear weapons test. However> in order for radioxenon monitoring to be practical, it was n e e s a y to develop an automated measurement system which could operate unattended for periods of months, measure the entjre spectrum of radioxenom, and provide hundreds of times better procedures. This capability was developed at the US. Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory based on rapid separation of atmospheric xenon coupled with a unique high sensitivity measurement device for the radioxenons. A fieldable prototype analyzer is scheduled for testing in August 1996 with commercid availability planned by 1998.
During the past three years, the united states has vigorously pursued negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) to establish a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which would prohibit even the smallest nuclear explosion.
Radionuclide monitoring is of particular impoTtance since it is the only method which can provide absolute assurance that a nuclear detonation has occurred. Radionuclide monitoring litemlly involves the sensitivities than current laboratory collection and analysis of a part of the bomb. Other monitoring methods can provide evidence of a suspect event but cannot show that the event was nuclear.
Initial tests of nuclear weapons by the U.S., U.S.S.R, United Kingdom, France, and the Peoples Republic of China were conducted in the atmosphere, and particulate fission product debris from such tests was readily observable over the entire hemisphere in which they were conducted. However, w i t h the development and application of underground testing technolo@es, the release of particulate fission products could be largely or completely eliminated and only the nonreactive gaseous fission products which are produced directly in the detonation may be vented to the atmosphere. Therefore, the only opportunity to detect or confirm a suspect event may be through observation of the unique ntios of the radioxenon fission pmducts. Of these, I3' Xe (9.10 hr), I3h"xe (2.19 day), and ' -' 3gXe (5.24 day) are the most abundant &er a vent The longer-lived radionuclide I3' mXe (1 1.9 day) is also produced but its concentration is orden of magnitude lower than any of the others. However, I3'Xe can enter the atmosphere from early reprocessing of nuclear fuels or from medical isotope production and usage. High detection sensitivity requirements are necessary since venting h m a nuclear detonation may only include a very small fraction of the total radioxenon produced. Subsequent atmospheric dispersion processes can result in major dilution before reaching a monitoring site. High sensitivity measurements of the four xenon radionuclides must be made in order to differentiate between atmospheric radioxenons h m nuclear power reactor operations, nuclear fuel reprocessin& or medical isotope production and usage. Consecutive measurements two or more times each day are important since a plume from an underground detonation m y pass by a monitoring station in just a few hours. A very important radioxenon is tbe 9.1 hr '35Xe which is more abundant than any of the other radioxenom during the first few days after a detonation, and its ambient backgmund is negligible. However, its short half-life requires analysis soon after collection in order to minimize the loss of sample through decay.
During the past three years, research has been carried out to develop a radioxenon monitoring system which would meet these requirements. Such a system has been developed and demonstrated and once commercialized, may serve as a monitoring instrument for verification of a CTBT. The technology involves collection of the I I 1 I I 1 1 concern to outlaw nuclear weapons development and testing. This latter test resulted in the accidental contamination and radiation sickness of the crew of the Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Drugon, and of residents on nearby atolls. Periodic atmospheric testing by the U.S. and the Soviet Union included several multimegaton detonations in 1961 and 1962. However, this atmospheric testing was formally ended with the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by the US.. the U.S.S.RI and the United Kingdqm and its entry into force October 10 of the same year. The LTBT prohibited testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and undenvater, and also underground testing that would allow nuclear debris to be transported beyond the borders of the country conducting the test. This treaty, however, was not accepted by France and the Peoples Republic of China which initiated their atmospheric testing programs in 1960 and 1964, respectively. Further progress toward cessation of nuclear weapons development and testing was achieved with the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NF'T) which was originally signed by 62 nations and entered into force on March 5, 1970. This treaty prohibited acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-weapons states and included safeguards provisions to monitor for processes leading to weapons production.
Additional progress in limiting underground testing was achieved with the signing of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty ( " B T ) on July 3, 1974, which prohibited tests having a yield of greater than 150 kT. Nevertheless, atmospheric testing of multimegaton weapons by the Peoples Republic of China, which was not a signatory, continued through 1980.
During the past three years, a rapid succession of events has taken place toward a verifiable Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In April 1993. President Clinton, at the Vancouver summit conference with President Yeltsin, committed the Administration to the negotiation of a multilateral nuclear test ban. In December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly approved by consensus a resolution to ban all nuclear weapons tests, and in January 1994 the Conference on Disarmament (CD) began negotiations on a CTBT. The 1994 negotiations are centered on a roiling text which is to be the basis for the final treaty. There is general agreement that a treaty verification regime would include four monitoring techniques-seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound. A major change in treaty emphasis resulted from an announcement on August 11, 1995, by President Clinton that the United States would seek a zero-yield test ban which would ban tests of any size, by any signatory anywhere on earth. This announcement was welcomed by most nations in the CD and energized the negotiation process. The zero-yield provision did, however, place a serious burden on the monitoring requirements, and R&D to enhance detection sensitivity by all monitoring technologies is a continuing process. atmospheric xenon by passing filtered, dry, cold air through a large charcoal adsorption bed for a specified period of time, followed by xenon elution and readsolption on a smaller adsorption bed prior to its injection into a specialized gas cell scintillation counter where high sensitivity energy analysis and electronphoton coincidence counting of the four xenon radionuclides are performed. This unique approach allows consecutive measurements of atmospheric radioxenon with sensitivities which are far greater than any method which has heretofore been used. which conceivably reduce detectability by other monitoring methods (seismic, hydroacoustic or inhsound) still have a substantial probability for, or in fact will result in venting of xenon noble gas radionuclides to the atmosphere. A worldwide monitoring system for continuous measurement of radioxenons should, therefore, provide a means for detection, and thus serve as a deterrent to conducting nuclear explosions.
IMPORTANCE OF MONITORING FOR COMPLIANCE

AIRBORNE DEBRIS FROM PAST
NUCLEAR TESTS
When atmospheric testing was conlucted, it was very easy to confirm the letonation based on collection and mdysis of particulate airborne radioacive debris. significant fraction of particulate debris to the atmosphere. With further experience by countries conducting underground tests, together with a determined effort by some to minimize or eliminate the release of particulates and radioactive gases, emissions from underground nuclear tests were substantially reduced and in many cases only the gaseous radionuclides were ever released. However, technologies which minimize radioactive gas release, h m underground tests for example, maximize the seismic signal and would, therefore, be comparatively easy to detect with proposed seismic monitoring networks. Of the noble gas fission products which are produced, the xadioxenoris are the most abundant. For example, the approximate amounts of 13%e (9.1 hr), '33"xe (2.19 day), 133gXe (5.24 day), and 13' mXe (11.9 day) which are instantly produced h m a 1-kT phtonium fission weapon are 2~1 0 '~: 2x1014, 2xIOI3, 5x10' Bq, respectively. The quantities of ' "%e, 13' Xe and I3""Xe f+om a detonation increase by about an order of magnitude during the f i r s t hour or two following a detonation due to ingrowth k m precursor fission products, and if they are formed in a location where they could be released to the atmosphere, they could mcrease the airborne mdioxenons substantially. However, it is far less likely that radioxenons produced by decay of precursors wiU be vented. The energy of a detonation could cause much of the radioxenon, which is produced directly, to move rapidly to the surface and be released in a matter of minutes. The precursors. however, would behave according to their chemical properties, perhaps being retained in or near the molten earth material leaving a lesser oppommity for escape of their daughterradioxenons. Nevertheless, if only 1% of the initially produced radioxenons were released to the atmosphere and any contriiution from precursors is ignored, this would amount to 2xlOI4, 2x101*, 2x10". and 5x107 Bq, respectively.
These
Principal Potential Sources of the Radioxenons qyantities are still veq large an4 with the exception of 131"' Xe, they auld be detected with high probability by a sensitive radioxenon analyzer in an International Monitoring System (TMS).
analyzer. it is possiile to measure all of these simultaneously. The pMcipal potential sources of each of these radionuclides in the atmosphere are summarized below.
EMISSIONS, NATURE AND
UNIQUENESS OF THE RADIOXENONS
The four most important radioxenons The significant sources of l3lrnxe are which enter the atmosphere .from nuclear limited. This radionuclide is present in operations are shown in the illwbiions irradiated nuclear fuel and will enter the along w i t h their half-lives and unique decay atmosphere when released from the fuel properties. With the automatic radioxenon during reprocessing. However, if the Radioxenons are released in small quantities from all operating nuclear reactors and could pose a serious problem to monitoring for compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) if other xenon radionuclides were not measured simultaneously. The lBgXe concentrations are easily measurable with a DOE automatic radioxenon analyzer. The ratios of lBmXe and 135Xe to 'SgXe, which are instantly produced in a nuclear detonation, are 100 and 10,000 times greater, respectively, than those from nuclear reactors, and this allows discrimination between these two sources.
delay time between irradiation and reprocessing is long; 200 days or more: the amounts released are insignificant because of its short halflife. The ament practice of storing nuclear fuels for a year or more before reprocessing assu~es that reprocessing is not a signiscant source of atmospheric radioxenoa The radionuclide 1339ce (5.24day) is produced for medical diagnostic applications by neutron inadiation of xenon gas and some I3' mXe (11.9 day) is also produced. However, the total quantities of both of these radionuclides which are produced and which may be accidentally released to the atmosphere are small and they should not provide a significant interference in monitoring for nuclear explosion radioxenon in the atmosphere unless a monitoring site were located near a processing or usage site. Since nuclear fuel reprocessing and medical isotope usage should not result in significant atmospheric releases, there is only one source of airborne mdioxenons which may interfere with the monitoring of the radioxenons from nuclear explosions.
This source is reactor operations. AU of the nuclear power reacton in the world release some radioxenon to the atmosphere, and the quantities currently in the atmosphere are substantial, particularly in the latitudes where most of the world's power reactors are locata Le.: between 30"N and 60"N latitudes. An example of the 1995 level of the radioxenon In%e in the northeast sector of the United States, where some 50 nuclear power reactors are in operation, is &own in the illustration. These concentrations are comparable to or greater than what one might expect at distant monitoring sites h m the minor venting of a subsurface detonation, and are therefore of concern. Fomtely, it is possible to distinguish between the spectrum of radioxenons which could be released from a subsurface detonation and those which are released from the operation of a nuclear reactor. For example, the ratio of 133"xe (2.19 day) to 1339ce (5.24day) from a subsurface vent would be expected to be more than 100 times greater than from reactor releases, while the ratio of I3%e (9.10 hr) to I3' %e would be expected to be about 10, OOO times greater.
The illustmtion on the next page provides a comparison of the ratios of these radioxenons which could enter the atmosphere from venting of a subsurface 4 detonation with those which could be or have been observed in the atmosphere in regions of high reactor density. Because of the very large dif€erences in these ratios, their determination can allow clear m e rentiation of explosion radioxenons from reactor radioxenons and thus minimize the effect of reactor sources in detecting nuclear explosion material. The simultaueous and sensitive measurement of the radioxenons which provide the basis for calculating these ratios is a key feature of instrument design.
NEED FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING FOR RADIOXENON
The intent of a CoIIIprehenSive Test Ban Treaty is to prohiiit nuclear explosions in any of the earth's environment. An
International Monitoring System (IMS) to support such a treaty could provide rapid detection of airborne radionuclides which would confirm evidence from seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, or other monitoring systems or provide an entirely independent detection of a nuclear detonation. Since a sensitive monitoring system may always detect some airborne 1,000. The ratios of the airborne xenon radionuclides which are present in regions of operating nuclear power reactors are dramatically different from those which are instantaneously produced in a nuclear explosion and which could be vented to the atmosphere. These differences are sufficient to distinguish between the sources where sufficient xenon can be collected to permit precise analysis.
radioxenon from reactor operations, it is important to continuously observe these levels and be able to recognize them as a background above which material from a nuclear detonation must be recognizable.
E measurements are made continually, then one can be more certain that an elevation in radioxenon concentration is the result of a nuclear detonation and is not simply an increase in the variable background which is maintained by nuclear reactor operations. Even though the radioxenon ratios from a nuclear detonation are very unique, if the concentrations were so low as to seriously limit measurement precision it would be important to recognize both the differences in the radioxenon ratios and increases in concentration to provide a confident observation of the nuclear detonation.
The importance of continuous radioxenon monitoring is p e h p s most evident for scenarios where only minor venting of xenon noble gas radionuclides occurs within minutes following a detonation. In such a case, downwind concentrations at monitoring sites m y be barely detectable.
There might only be a detectable concentmtion for a matter of a few hours at a given monitoring site. By Carrying out continuous consecutive short-term collections and immediate analyses, made pI;lctical through automation, the probability of detedng a small vent wiU be improved substantially.
NEED FOR HIGH SENSITIVITY MEASUREMENTS
In monitoring for evidence of an underground detonation where only radioxenons are emitted in significant quantities, the detection probability at downwind monitoring sites will be directly related to detection sensitivity. Detection sensitivity is affected by several factors including the size of the sample which is collected, the counting efficiency, the background counting rate of the instrument the background concentration of each radioxenon in the atmosphere, the decay time between sample collection and analysis, and the length of the counting period. For example, a 10-fold increase in sample size could provide up to a IO-fold increase in detection sensitivity. Impmving the counting efficiency by 5-fold could provide up to a 5-fold improvement in counting sensitivity. A 1000-fold reduction in the background counting rate could improve detection by the square root of this number or about 30-fold. Increasing the counting time by 10-fold could increase the sensitivity by up to 3-fold, and limiting decay time between collection and analysis from 70 hours to 4 hours could, in the case of the short-lived ' "Xe (9.1 hr), improve the detection sensitivity by 100-fold All of these parameters were considered in the development of the automatic radioxenon analyzer and were optimized for increased sensitivity where possible.
AUTOMATED NEAR REAL-TIMJC RADIOXENON MEASUREMENTS
In order to monitor a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty based on airborne radionuclide measurements in a practical manner, it would be essential to have automated systems whereby atmospheric levels could be observed continuously. An atmospheric detonation or the major venting of particulate debris from an underground event is comparatively easy to detect with automated particulate sampler/analyzer systems.
Where an underground, underwater, or other detonation occurs such that only radioxenon is vented, then detectiodverifkation must be based on xenon separation and The radioxenon analyzer is a fully automatic unit for ultrasensitive analysis. It provides near-real-time simultaneous measurements of airborne IsrmXe (11.9 d q ) , '33m!e (2.19 d q ) , Is3gXe (5.24 day), and135Xe (9.10 hr). The high-volume (5 to I O m3/hr) analyzer passesjiltered air through a molecular sieve/aluminum oxide bed for removal of moisture, carbon dioxide, acid gases, and part of the radon, and then through a charcoal sorption bed at -120°C for xenon collection. The xenon is then thermally desorbed purified and measured by beta (andor conversion electron)-gamma (or x-ray) coincidence spectromeby. The beta-gamma-rq spectra and radionuclide concentrations are automatically transmitted to appropriate organizations. The gas samples can be retained for central laboratory confirmatory analysis. By automation and making this technology commercially available, all countries can have the means to monitor radioxenons under a CTBT radionuclide composition. Previous methods for measuring atmospheric radioxenon have been expensive, laborious, very time-consuming, and have had limited sensitivity. Basically they involved separation of xenon from the atmosphere by low-temperature adsorption or cryogenic distillation followed by laboratory-based chromatographic purification and counting the radioxenon by one of a number of procedures which were adequate for the intended purpose. The new technology developed at the DOEPNNL allows near real-time monitoring with an automated analyzer which measures radioxenons on integrated samples collected a few times each day from very large volumes of air and allows automatic tmmmission of concentrations to the National and Intexnalional Data Centers. A schematic of the separation and counting systems employed in this automatic radioxenon analyzer is shown in the illustrations.
The separation and purification of atmospheric xenon which contains the radioxenon isotopes of interest, require special care because of its low concentration, 87 parts-per-billion, and the fact that the ambient activity of the ~t~~~a l l y occuning radioactive gas, ?In, can be hundreds of thousands of times greater than the sensiliviiy limits that the automated radioxenon analyzer is designed to achieve. Thus: the system (affectionately known as the Xenon Xephyr) must be capable of automatidy separating, purifying, and analyzing the radioxenons by procedures which require consistently reproduciile sepmtions and very selective counting. The separation and detection procedures invohre the following principles.
Air is continuously filtered and the moisture and most of the carbon dioxide and some radon removed at near room temperature on a large molecular sieve/ aluminum oxide column. The air then flows through a chiller where its temperature is lowered to -120°C, through a short charcoal bed (radon trap) and on through a longer charcoal bed which is maintained at approximately -120°C and which collects the xenon and a fraction of the other atmospheric gases. The radon trap operating at -120°C is about 50°C below its freezing point (-71°C) and retains better than 99% of this gas during an operating period. It also retains up to 5% of the xenon product (freezing point -112°C); however, all of the remaining xenon is retained on the much larger second trap where the linear flow rate is about onefourth and the bed length 5 times greater. Once the collection interval of 8 to 12 hours is complete, the air stream is diverted to a second charcoal trap system and a second collection process is initiated. The first radon trap is regenerated by backtlushing with nitrogen at 300°C. Meanwhile3 the xenon trap is evacuated while the temperature is allowed to rise to -100°C which allows the release of most of the lower boiling constituents, iucluding oxygen and argon. It is then filled with dty nitrogen, and the temperature raised to 300°C. The xenon is eluted with 300°C nitrogen gas flowing at 300 cdmin for three hours. This eluent is cooled to about 25T, flows through a CQ/moisture ttzq, to remove any traces of CO, and H,O, is cooled to 40°C and passes through a short molecular sieve trap to remove any remaining d o n , through a cooler to reduce its tempemture to -120"C, and through a smaU charcoal bed where the xenon is collected The small xenon trap (0.5 cc) is then evacuated while the temperature is allowed to rise to about -100°C. This facilitates the removal of most of the remaining atmospheric gases.
While maintaining the vacuum, the soqtion bed is valved to a 1O-cc gas cell scintillator counter and the gas analysis port of an on-line residual gas analyzer. This end section of the analysis system is then valved off and the temperature in the small xenon t q raid to 300°C for 5 minutes to desorb the trapped xenon and cause most of it to flow mto the gas cell scintillator counter.
Following the xenon tmder, a valve is closed to retain the radioxenon in the scintillation counting cell where it is measured for a period of up to 36hom. The residual gas analyzer provides precise analysis of the fiaction of xenon in the gas cell, which is about 40%. This information, together with gas pressure and mdioxenm counting rates, permits the automatic The decay of each of the radioxenons involves the simultaneous emission of one or more electrons (beta particles or conversion electrons) and photons (gamma rays or x-rays) with characteristic energies. By separating xenon gas from the atmosphere, injecting it into a gas cell scintillation counter located between large gamma-ray detectors in a cylindrical gamma-ray detector, md recording the energies of coincident electron-photon emissions, it is possible to selectively measure each of the radioxenons with practically no interference from external radiation.
calculation of the individual xenon radionuclide concentrations. Automation allows the whole process of separation and counting to be continued on subsequent samples so that up to four samples are simultanmusly being analyzed in separate gas scintillation cells which are viewed by two large area NaI(T1) detectors of a gammaray spectrometer. The gamma-ray spectral data can be automatically transmitted to the National Data Center at the conclusion of the measurement or at an earlier time if nuclear weapons radioxenons are observed.
ACEUEVINGRELIABILITY
AND HIGH SENSITIVITY
The automatic radioxenon analyzer design goal is to operate without consumables and maintenance for periods of a year or more. The nitrogen gas required in the elution process is produced with a small nitrogen genemtor which is an integral part of the system. All of the processes involved in the separation do require precise control; however, their automation is straightforward and remote reliable operation can be maintained. All of the sorption columns are automatically regenerated in the process except the C02 trap which removes the last trace of CO, in the final xenon cleanup.
While these are not regeneratable, they have sufticient capacity to allow operation for a year or more.
This approach which can provide a 100-to 1000-fold better sensitivity than previous methods for a given collection period, results from the collection of a 10-to 25-fold larger sample during an 8-to 12-hour period, 3-to 4-fold higher counting efficiency, a lo3-to lo4-fold lower background, and the almost immediate automatic sample analysis to minimize losses of the short-lived xenons to radioactive decay. Delays of several hours to a few days could result in major losses of 13' Xe (9.10 hr), and significant losses of the ' 33mXe (2.19 day). A key to the very high-sensitivity measurement of the radioxenons is that the gas cell scintillator counters sense electrons emitted in either nuclear beta decay or internal conversion and measure their energy. These electrons s m e as triggas for recording the energies of gamma or x-rays which are emitted at essentially the same time as the electrons. For example: 13' Xe (9.1 hr) decays by emission of beta particles (electrons) with possible energies up to 910 keV. These electrons are in coincidence with a 250-keV gamma ray as indicated in the illustration. The gas cell scintillator counter observes an electron and triggers the gamma-ray spectrometer to accept a coincident gamma-ray signal h m either of the N a I Q gamma-ray detectors. By using this approach, it is possible to reduce the background counting rate by about four orders of magnitude with only a minor decrease in counting efficiency.
Similarly, the principal decay mode of '33"Xe involves the emission of an i n t dconversion electron from a 233-keV transition. The detectable radiation consists of a 31-keV x-ray and a 200-keV conversion electron. The 200-keV electron is easily and selectively observed in the gas cell scintillation counter and smes as a trigger to permit storage of the 31-keV x-ray which m y be observed by either of the NaI(TI) detectors. Again, the background interference in the measurement of the '33"xe is reduced by about four orders of magnitude by requiring a unique signature from the gas cell scintillation counter to trigger storage of the x-ray observed by a NaI(Tl) crystal. The third radionuclide of major importance is the 133gXe which decays by emission of a 346-keV (maximum energy) beta particle (electron) in coincidence with an 81-keV gamma ray. By requiring a beta coincidence trigger ftom the gas cell scintillation counter to trigger storage of the 81-keV gamma-ray signal h m the N a I Q a -y a it is again possible to reduce background interference by about four orders of magnitude. In the case of 133gXe, there is also a separate signature resulting from the internal conversion of about 63% of the 81-keV transition energy to provide a 50-keV internal conversion electron and a 31-keV x-ray. A coincidence event between these two emissions plus the beta particles serves as an additional basis for very selectively measuring the concentration of the ' "%e.
The '31"xe (11.9 day) is not produced in significant amounts in a nuclear 
